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ABSTRACT
Though a lot of work in multi agent systems is focused on reasoning about knowledge and beliefs of
artificial agents, an explicit representation and reasoning about presence/absence of agents, especially
in the scenarios where agents may be unaware of other agents joining in or going offline in a
multi-agent system, leading to partial knowledge/asymmetric knowledge of the agents is mostly
overlooked by the MAS community. Such scenarios lay the foundations of cases where an agent can
influence other agents’ mental states by (mis)informing them about presence/absence of collaborators
or adversaries. In this paper we investigate how Kripke structure based epistemic models can be
extended to express the above notion based on an agent’s subjective knowledge and we discuss the
challenges that come along.
Keywords Subjective Knowledge · Epistemic Reasoning · Agency · Beliefs · Ontological Reasoning · Fictional
Characters
1 Introduction
The research community has successfully used Kripke models to model epistemic situations in multiagent systems. But
it seems necessary to have a broader notion of epistemic models that may not always be defined within the interpretation
of the structural properties of S5 or KD45 Kripke models which are used to represent uncertainty (knowledge) of
agents in a multi-agent system. We envisage an underlying global epistemic structure in a multi agent system, wherein
the agents may have access to (non)overlapping local regions. Hence the agents can be said to possess subjective
knowledge about the system. Such a global epistemic structure allows us to talk about the possibility of agents being
ignorant of the presence of other agents. While we talk of ignorance, we point out that there are two levels of it as we
perceive it: one, where an agent is uncertain whether something is true or false but it is certain that it exists to be known,
while the other is at the level of existence itself. We restrict ourself to modeling the first level of ignorance only. The
community uses KD45 Kripke structures to model beliefs instead of knowledge but these beliefs are typically about the
world and not about the agents. The agents are assumed to be aware of all other agents.
In this paper we explore ways to relax this assumption in the epistemic models based on KD45 Kripke structures.
First we motivate the work with an example: Consider a scenario involving multi-vehicle search and rescue. Three
(unmanned) vehicles V1, V2, V3 have been assigned to survey a sequence of points looking for survivors. Each vehicle
knows whether there are survivors at their respective surveyed points and send updates to each other. This is how they
are pre-scripted to collaborate. Meanwhile V1 fails (assuming a failure signal be sent out to others1), V2 and V3 have
to complete the task on their own. The belief bases of V2 and V3 should get updated so that the strategy to accomplish
the remaining task can be recomputed. If on the other hand, more vehicles (which were off-line or disconnected earlier)
join the team midway or say V1 is up and running after certain interval of time, the existing ones should be able to
‘understand and update’ its presence in their belief bases to recompute their strategies.
Consider another setting where the system modeler may want the agents to work independently, as if they are in a single
1we proceed with this assumption for the rest of the paper
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agent setting, in the initial phases of the task and collaborate with each other at a later stage. Such scenarios can arise in
privacy- preserving use cases. We feel that a formalism that facilitates an artificial agent to explicitly model and reason
with its (un)certainty about other agents will be useful in the settings discussed above. We explore other avenues as well
where the capability of reasoning about agency can be used by an agent to influence other agents’ beliefs about agency.
We discuss this in detail in a separate section dedicated to ontological lies2.
2 Background
Before discussing the scope of extending epistemic logic to support our formalism we briefly look at the basics.
Epistemic logic, the logic of knowledge and beliefs [5], is used to reason with an agent’s knowledge about the world as
well as its own (and the others’) beliefs about the world, beliefs about beliefs and so on.
Language: Let P andAG be a finite set of propositions and agents respectively. The language can be constructed using
the formulae given below:
φ = p | ¬φ | (φ ∧ ϕ) |Kiφ
where p ∈ P and i ∈ AG. The intended interpretation of Kiφ is ‘agent i knows φ’. It is the basic system of knowledge
known as S5 system whose axiomatization will be discussed after we have looked at its possible worlds semantics
using Kripke models.
Semantics: Kripke structures enable the agents to think in terms of possible worlds accessible to them and an agent is
said to know or believe some state of affairs to be true, if and only if, it is the true with respect to all the possible worlds
accessible to it.
Definition 1 (Kripke Model). Given the set of propositions P and the set of agents AG, a Kripke model is a triple
M = 〈S,R, V 〉, where: S is a set of states, R is a function, such that for all i ∈ AG, there is an accessibility relation
defined R(i) ⊆ S × S, V : P → 2S is a valuation function for all p ∈ P , the set V (p) ⊆ S is the set of states in which
p is true.
M = 〈S,R, V 〉 is called an epistemic model and all the relations R in M are equivalence relations (which explains the
truth and introspective properties, i.e. S5 properties, of knowledge). Epistemic formulas are interpreted on pairs (M, s),
also called as a pointed model, and a formula φ is true in (M, s) is written as (M, s) |= φ. Thus, the satisfaction of
a formula can be expressed as: (i) (M, s) |= p iff s ∈ V (p), (ii) (M, s) |= (φ ∧ ϕ) iff (M, s) |= φ and (M, s) |= ϕ,
(iii) (M, s) |= ¬φ iff not (M, s) |= φ and (iv) (M, s) |= Kiφ iff for all t such that (s, t) ∈ R(i), (M, t) |= φ. Here,
(s, t) ∈ R(i) stands for existence of accessibility relation of agent i between the two epistemic states s and t.
Axiomatisation: The axioms of S5 system of knowledge include all instantiations of propositional tautologies, along
with the following axioms:
• Distribution of Ki over→: Ki(φ) ∧Ki(φ→ ϕ)→ Ki(ϕ)
• Modus Ponens: From φ and φ→ ϕ, infer ϕ
• Necessitation of Ki: From φ, infer Kiφ
• Truth: Kiφ→ φ
• Positive Introspection: Ki(φ)→ Ki(Ki(φ))
• Negative Introspection: ¬Ki(φ)→ Ki(¬Ki(φ))
The first three axioms present a minimal modal logic which captures valid formulas of all Kripke models. This
axiomatisation is called modal systemK. The Truth axiom, also referred as T axiom, states that whatever is known must
be true. The last two axioms, also denoted by axiom 4 and axiom 5 respectively, express the introspective properties of
an agent towards what it knows and what it doesn’t know. The class of Kripke models with equivalence (accessibility)
relations is denoted by S5. We would be working with beliefs, and not knowledge, where believed statements need not
be true but must be internally consistent. Constraining the Kripke structures with only serial, transitive, and Euclidean
relations in R, allows us to talk about the beliefs of agents [4]. In such a system, the axiom T is replaced by axiom
D : Biφ→ ¬Bi¬φ (note the replacement of K modality with B modality) and the rest of the axioms remain the same
with a belief modality B replacing the knowledge modality K, and therefore, it is called as KD45 system. In the rest
of the paper, we might use the terms knowledge and belief interchangeably but we confine ourselves only to belief as
expressed in the KD45 system.
2the term ‘ontological lies’ refers to lies about presence/absence of an agent
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3 Proposed Approach
Informal Discussion: When we model knowledge and beliefs in a multi-agent system using a Kripke model, the
accessibility relations are defined for each agent for each state in the model to implicitly represent that all agents know
the other agents and it is common knowledge. The accessibility relations corresponding to an agent enables us to
represent the respective agent’s uncertainty about the real world but not about the agency. For example: Figure 1
illustrates a S5 Kripke structure which captures the agents’ beliefs (or uncertainty) about the truth of proposition p.
Figure 1: An S5 Kripke model
It can be considered as a closed world representation (with respect to agents as well as propositions) given a finite set of
propositions P = {p} and a finite set of agents AG = {m, f}. Let us assume that the shaded circle is the true world.
From an external perspective we see that the model expresses that in the true state m knows that p is false, f is uncertain
whether p is true or false but f is certain that m knows whether p. Both the agents are implicitly aware of each other.
We don’t advocate an open world setting by making either P or Ag a non-finite set but we propose that agents should be
allowed to expand their epistemic model, as and when updates about new agents joining in or existing ones leaving
out, by applying the relations transformation functions we discuss in the following section. In this paper, we restrict
ourselves to introducing new agents (and not new facts) in the system. The facts that agent can know (or believe) remain
same.
3.1 Formalization
Along the lines of the above definition of epistemic model, to represent an external as well as perspectival view of
agents in a multi-agent system, we define some additional terms and notations as discussed below:
Local states corresponding to each agent - I : AG → 2S is a function such that for all i ∈ AG, the set I(i) ⊆ S is the
set of states that agent i cannot distinguish from the real state in the initial model. It closely resembles the concept of
designated states discussed in [2]. We assume that the system is initiated with a set of local states for each agent and we
investigate how the set I(i) corresponding to each agent i evolves as new updates present themselves.
i-reachable states: These are the states which can be reached by an i-edge from any state. We observe that I(i) and its
1-hop neighborhood in the Kripke structure defines what i believes in from a subjective perspective.
Then there are j edges emanating from states in this region that defines i’s perception of j’s beliefs.
To express an agent’s uncertainty about the presence of another agent we consider the local states corresponding to the
respective agent and their neighborhood and define two modal operators, Pi read as Possibly_an_agent_for_i and Ci
read as Certainly_an_agent_for_i.
The full set of formulas can be given by the following BNF:
φ = p | ¬φ | (φ ∧ ϕ) |Kiφ|Cij|Pij
where p ∈ P and i, j ∈ AG
The interpretation of these modalities is defined as follows:
• (M, s) |= Cij iff for all t such that (s, t) ∈ R(i), there exists atleast one u such that (t, u) ∈ R(j).
• M |= Cij iff for all s ∈ I(i), (M, s) |= Cij.
We treat Pij as dual of Cij such that they mimic the ‘diamond’ and the ‘box’ operator respectively.
We proceed with the possible worlds semantics of epistemic logic for the language defined above. As in epistemic logic
the possible worlds represent an agent’s uncertainty in terms of possible epistemic alternatives, we extend it further to
reason with an agent’s uncertainty about the presence of other agents in terms the agents’ accessibility to the shared
epistemic alternatives.
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Figure 2: A KD45 Kripke model
We expand on this concept with the help of the following example:
Consider a KD45 Kripke model, in the figure below, defined over some finite set of propositions, a
finite set of agents AG = {m, f, g} and a Kripke model M = 〈S,R, V 〉 where S = {1, 2, 3},
R(m) = {(1, 1), (2, 2), (2, 1), (1, 2), (3, 3)}, R(f) = {(1, 3), (2, 3), (3, 3)}, R(g) = {(3, 3)}. Let the local
states for each agents be given as: I(m) = {1, 2}, I(f) = {3} and I(g) = {3}.
Let (M, 1) |= p, (M, 2) |= ¬p and (M, 3) |= p. The epistemic formulas expressed on this model are: ¬Bmp,
BmBfp, BfBmp, BfBgp etc. The ontological formulas (as we have called them so) expressed on this model are:
¬Pmg,Bm¬Pmg, BmBfCfg, BfCmg etc.
The interpretation of the above model is that agent m, which can not distinguish between the two epistemic states: 1 and
2 (represented by its local states), is certain of presence of only one agent f and is itself oblivious of presence of another
agent g. In both of those epistemic states it believes that the agent f considers a third and only epistemic state possible
where it is not only certain of presence of m but also certain of presence of another agent g. Similarly, agent f is certain
of presence of agents m as well as g and believes that all three (including itself) are aware of each other. Clearly, if the
true state had been {3}, we as an external agent can very well look at the model and tell that m is mistaken in its beliefs
about presence of only two agent in the system. Contrary to that, had one of {1, 2} been the true state, we see that there
are only two agents in the system which m is aware of and it is also aware of the fact that f is not only imagining an
epistemic situation where another agent g is present but also believes that everybody else shares the same belief.
One may argue that the seriality of the relations, say R(g) in the above example, vanishes. We emphasize again that the
KD45 properties be maintained in a localised manner. Consider R(m) = {(1, 1), (2, 2), (1, 2), (2, 1), (3, 3)} which
stands for the accessibility relation for m. We don’t use R(m) to define m’s subjective knowledge. Instead we use its
subset R′(m) = {(1, 1), (2, 2), (1, 2), (2, 1)} whose domain is restricted to I(m). Similarly the subjective knowledge
of f and g is defined using R′(f) = {(3, 3)} and R′(g) = {(3, 3)} respectively. Now that we can explicitly express the
awareness of agents about other agents, in the following section we introduce operators that can influence the same.
3.2 Ontological updates
In literature, update models from Dynamic Epistemic Logic [8] have been preferably used to formalize reasoning about
information change in Kripke models. Another popular approach is using agent language mA+ [1]. While we agree
that the former can be used for modeling epistemic and ontic actions in our proposed setting too, it cannot be used
to model the dynamics in agency that we discussed. The latter approach, agent language mA+ is known to be used
with Finitary-S5 theories [7] and therefore can not be used with arbitrary Kripke structures. To suit our purpose we
describe two model transformation operators. We give their semantics using relation changing transition functions
which transform one epistemic model to another.
• Update_offline(j): The updated model reflects that agent j has (permanently) gone offline and other agents
have updated their awareness about its absence and their beliefs about its beliefs. The resultant model, M ′,
can be constructed from the initial model M , in the following manner:
– Initialize the resultant model by creating a replica of the initial model: M ′ = M
– The set of agents with respect to the resultant model: AG′ is set to (AG − j)
– The local states I(i) of all agents i ∈ AG′ remains the same.
– Remove R(j) such that for all i ∈ AG, ¬Pij holds: M ′ = M ′ 	r R(j)
4
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Note that we use 	r operator to delete the specified relation from the model. Removal of edges may leave M ′
disconnected. The regions that are not reachable from the local states of the agents are discarded.
Figure 3: An example scenario to demonstrate update_offline(v1)
Example: Consider a scenario in Figure 3a. There are three unmanned vehicles {v1, v2, v3}. The Kripke model
illustrated in the figure3 shows the eight possible worlds (each labeled node having some assignment over a finite set of
propositions by the valuation function). The shaded node corresponds to the true world and the edges labeled with
the agents represent the uncertainty of the respective agents. The dashed rectangles represent their local states. In
this scenario, v1 leaves and the updated model is shown is Figure 3b. We observe that as v1 leaves, the epistemic
possibilities that were present due to uncertainty of v1, gets disconnected and are of no relevance now. This component
can be discarded.
• Update_online(j, I(j)): The updated model reflects that agent j has joined the system. Other agents become
aware of its presence. Besides that the earlier beliefs of the rest of the agents should remain intact. The model
is updated with the local states of j(as specified by the external modeler). The resultant model, M ′, can be
constructed from the initial model M , in the following manner:
– Initialize the resultant model by creating a replica of the initial model: M ′ = M
– The local states I(i) of all agents i ∈ AG remains the same.
– The set of agents with respect to the resultant model: AG′ is set to (AG + j)
– Mark the local states (as specified in the update) for j: I(j) in M ′.
– Add an equivalence relation R(j) for j on S, the set of all possible states: M ′ = M ⊕r R(j) . Now, for
all i ∈ AG, Cij holds true with respect to their respective I(i)s.
Note that we use ⊕r operator to add the specified relation to the model.
As long as the agent updates are truthful and commonly known among all the agents, the model size (in terms of
number of possible worlds) remain same and number of edges increases (or decreases) because we assume that the new
agent cannot distinguish one epistemic state from others. The other agents too are aware of its ignorance. In planning
based scenario, the beliefs of new agent (and hence that of the others too) can be further refined using information
updates/requests in a goal driven manner. If we try to lift this assumption, say j joins the group with some beliefs then
the updated model grows to accommodate the different beliefs of different agents about j’s beliefs. For instance, each
existing agent may falsely believe that the new agent shares the same view of the world that it itself has. If all the agents
are biased to believe so, then the model expands atleast |AG| times.
The updates that we discussed above bring common information for all the existing agents and the resultant model
aligns with the true state of the world that the agents may still be uncertain about or yet to discover. But as it is the case
with untruthful epistemic updates, that can be exploited to synthesize lies and deceptive plans, ontological updates too
can be exploited to synthesize ontological lies. We give a brief account of ontological lies in the following section.
3Note: This structure resembles the 3-muddy children puzzle but we do not model the same problem here. Consider it as an
epistemic situation that shares similar neighborhood.
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4 Epistemic lies versus Ontological lies
If we take the view of subjective epistemic reasoning, we can define lying as follows. Lying is the communication
of something that one does not believe in, usually done with the intention of misleading someone. We observe that
there are two very different kinds of lies, requiring different kinds of cognitive machinery. The simpler kind of lie is
epistemological. Here the agent merely makes a statement that could have been true, but is not in fact. For example,
a bridge player advertising a card she does not hold, or a person telling a habitual borrower that he has no money at
hand. The second kind of lie is ontological in which a new category is created; imagined and invented. For example,
children are often told that a tooth fairy will come and take away a broken tooth. Though epistemological lies have been
investigated by epistemic planning community, we, to the best of our beliefs, are not aware of such pursuits vis-a-vis
ontological lies by artificial agents.
Our pursuit of studying ontological lies derives motivation from The Gruffalo [3], written by Julia Donaldson it is a
children’s book featuring the deceit carried out by a clever mouse, the leading character of the story, to safeguard itself
from the dangerous predators (a fox, an owl, a snake and finally, a gruffalo, a creature that the mouse thought it was
imagining) in a forest. The interesting course of events that happens in the story is given below:4
The mouse, while taking a walk in a forest, runs into, one by one in sequence, a fox, an owl, and a snake. Each of these
animals, clearly intending to eat the mouse, invite him back to their home for a meal. The cunning mouse declines
each offer. To dissuade further advances, he tells each animal that he has plans to dine with his friend, a gruffalo, a
monster-like hybrid that is half grizzly bear and half buffalo, whose favorite food happens to be the animal in question,
and describes to each the relevant dangerous features of the gruffalo’s monstrous anatomy. Frightened that the gruffalo
might eat it, each animal flees. Knowing the gruffalo to be fictional, the mouse gloats thus: Silly old fox/owl/snake,
doesn’t he know? there’s no such thing as a gruffalo! After getting rid of the last animal, the mouse is shocked to
encounter a real gruffalo - with all the frightening features the mouse thought that he was inventing. The gruffalo
threatens to eat the mouse, but again the mouse resorts to imaginative deception. He tells the gruffalo that he, the
mouse, is the scariest animal in the forest. Laughing, the gruffalo agrees to follow the mouse as he demonstrates how
feared he is. The two walk through the forest, encountering in turn the animals that had earlier menaced the mouse.
Each is terrified by the sight of the pair and runs off - and each time the gruffalo becomes more convinced about the
fear that the mouse apparently evokes in everyone. Observing the success of his deception, the mouse then threat-
ens to make a meal out of the gruffalo, which flees in haste, leaving the mouse to enjoy its vegetarian diet of a nut in peace.
As studied before [6] the first lie the mouse tells is of the latter type, while the second one is of the former type.
Ontological lies perhaps require more sophisticated cognitive machinery. Certainly a more imaginative mind. We
analyse ontological lies using the setting discussed above.
4.1 Ontological lies: untruthful agent updates
Let (M, I(ag)) and (M ′, I ′(ag)) denote the initial and the resultant system respectively. Note that the agent update
operators either add or remove accessibility relations and as a result, new epistemic states are also added to or removed
from the initial model M = 〈S,R, V 〉 get the resultant model M ′ = 〈S′, R′, V ′〉. For ease of further discussion, we
use M(S) to denote the set of possible worlds in model M , M(R) to denote all the relations in model, M(V ) to refer
to the valuation function used and I(M,ag) to refer to the set of local states of agent ag in M .
4.1.1 Untruthful Update_offline(j) by agent i:
The updated model reflects that agent j has (permanently) gone offline for the misinformed agents but not for i and j,
that is, for all k ∈ (AG \ {i, j}), ¬Pkj holds where as for k ∈ {i, j}, Ckj holds. The resultant model is constructed in
the following manner:
• Given the initial model M , the resultant model M ′ is initialized by creating two replicas of M, say Mact
and Mshift. Mact corresponds to the true scenario whereas Mshift corresponds to epistemic state of the
misinformed agents. We use sact, sshift to denote the states in Mact and Mshift corresponding to the state s
in the initial model M . Update the domain of the resultant model S′ = Mact(S) ∪Mshift(S).
• Remove the accessibility relations of the agent j, which is falsely announced to be offline, from the region
that reflects the epistemic region of misinformed agents: Mshift = Mshift 	r Rshift(j) where Rshift(j) =
{(sshift, tshift) |(s, t) ∈ R(j)}.
4https : //en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Gruffalo
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• Remove accessibility of misinformed agents from the epistemic region that reflects the true state of affairs.
Mact = Mact 	r Ract(k) where Ract(k) = {(sact, tact)| (s, t) ∈ R(k)} for all k ∈ (AG \ {i, j}).
• Update the accessibility relations of all the agents in the resultant model: firstly, for all k ∈ AG, R′(k) =
Ract(k) ⊕r Rshift(k). Then add edges to the accessibility relations of misinformed agents such that their
reachability goes from the epistemic region that reflects the true state of affairs to the region that reflects
the epistemic region of misinformed agents. It is done in the following manner: for all k ∈ AG \ {i, j},
R′(k) = R′(k) ⊕r Raddlinks where Raddlinks = {(sact, tshift)| (s, t) ∈ R(k)}
• Set the local states of the informed agents (i and j), as they were in the previous model M , in the epistemic
region represented by Mact. But the local states of misinformed agents (i.e. other than i and j) can not lie
in this region, they are shifted to the epistemic region represented by Mshift which reflects the absence of j.
Formally, in the resultant model, M ′, for all k ∈ (AG \ {i, j}), update I ′(k) = {sshift| s ∈ I(M,k)} and for
all k ∈ {i, j}, I ′(k) = {sact| s ∈ I(M,k)}.
• The above steps may leave the updated structure disconnected. Discard the components that are not reachable
from the local states of the informed agents. The remaining structure is denoted as M ′ and the set S′ and R′
are updated with M ′(S) and M ′(R) respectively.
4.1.2 Untruthful Update_online(j) from by i:
We define similar relations transformation functions to update the model such that all the agents except i believe that
agent j joins the group, that is, for all k ∈ (AG \ {i}), Ckj holds while for i, ¬Pij holds. The resultant model can be
constructed in the following manner:
• Given the initial model M , the resultant model M ′ is initialized by creating two replicas of M, say Mact
and Mshift. Mact corresponds to the true scenario whereas Mshift corresponds to epistemic state of the
misinformed agents. We use sact, sshift to denote the states in Mact and Mshift corresponding to the state s
in the initial model M . Update the domain of the resultant model S′ = Mact(S) ∪Mshift(S).
• Add accessibility of the agent j, which is falsely announced to have come online, to the region that reflects the
epistemic region of misinformed agents by using Update_online(j, I(j)) on Mshift.
• Remove accessibility of misinformed agents from the epistemic region that reflects the true state of affairs.
Mact = Mact 	r Ract(k) where Ract(k) = {(sact, tact)| (s, t) ∈ R(k)} for all k ∈ (AG \ {i}).
• Update the accessibility relations of all the agents in the resultant model: firstly, for all k ∈ AG, R′(k) =
Ract(k)⊕r Rshift(k). Then, add edges to the accessibility relations of misinformed agents such that their
reachability goes from the epistemic region that reflects the true state of affairs to the region that reflects
the epistemic region of misinformed agents: for all k ∈ (AG \ {i}), R′(k) = R′(k) ⊕r Raddlinks where
Raddlinks = {(sact, tshift)| (s, t) ∈ R(k)}.
• Set the local states of the informed agent (i), as they were in the previous model M , in the epistemic region
represented by Mact. But the local states of misinformed agents (i.e. other than i) can not lie in this region,
they are shifted to the epistemic region represented by Mshift which reflects the presence of j. Formally,
in the resultant model, M ′, for all k ∈ (AG \ {i}), update I ′(k) = {sshift| s ∈ I(M,k)} and for all i,
I ′(i) = {sact| s ∈ I(M, i)}.
• The above steps may leave the updated structure disconnected. Discard the components that are not reachable
from the local states of the informed agents. The remaining structure is denoted as M ′ and the set S′ and R′
are updated with M ′(S) and M ′(R) respectively.
Example: In Figure 4 we demonstrate the model transformation from 4a to 4b owing to the false ontological update
by the mouse (m) about an imaginary gruffalo (g) to the fox (f) as discussed in the story earlier. The dashed rectangular
boxes show their initial and shifted local states in 4a and 4b respectively.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we explore an epistemic modeling technique based on Kripke structures wherein agents may be able to
influence other agents’ mental states by (mis)informing them about the presence/absence of other agents. We define two
modal operators to express an agent’s certainty about the agency. Then we define model transformation operators which
we call ontological updates. We observe that the model grows faster in case of untruthful updates. We also discuss
some examples to demonstrate the working of our approach. We feel that these ontological updates can be used in
planning based settings in artificial intelligence. The idea of imagining fictional characters seems to be an in interesting
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Figure 4: An example scenario to demonstrate untruthful update_online(g)
pursuit if studied in an epistemic planning based setting augmented with ontological updates. We hope to explore this
avenue in the future. In this formalism, we restrict ourselves to the propositions that stand for world knowledge thereby
excluding the agent-specific knowledge. For instance, in the muddy children puzzle each proposition stands for some
child being muddy. It is not clear how to maintain and handle these propositions and hence beliefs about them in the
setting where the agents may join or leave the system. These are the few issues that the discussed approach does not
address but need to be addressed in order for the approach to be useful for solving a wide class of problems.
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